Why Can’t We All Just Get Along?

Moral Relativism (2)
By T.M. Moore|Published Date: August 29, 2011

Who’s to say?
In a famous scene in Monty Python and the Holy Grail, the lord of a castle seeks to bring peace to warring opponents by saying, “Now, now, let’s not fight and squabble about who killed who.”

His point is that a little mayhem and death are inevitable, but enough’s enough when he’s had enough. And who was to say he was wrong? He was the ruler. 

Moral relativism is a bit like that. Some moral relativists, such as Dr. Jesse Prinz, believe that morals are a function of emotions. How we feel, and how we learn to feel, about certain actions, will determine our choice of actions in the days to come. Early emotional responses build into a repertoire of choices and behaviors which function as our ethical framework.

Yet while a certain amount of emotion is necessary, and gives rise to our sense of moral “oughtness,” too much emotion can be dangerous and, thus, needs to be controlled.

But who is to decide on such meanings as “dangerous” and “controlled”? Usually it will be those who have the power – persuasive, political, or otherwise – to make their preferences stick.

Moral relativists like Dr. Prinz show that they understand the role of affections in life – a very important role, according to the Scriptures. But they leave as many questions unanswered as answered, including the most basic question of all, “Why should we care about the way anyone feels?”

Morality and culture
Morality as grounded in emotions, however, is but one of several paths of ethical theory which moral relativists tread.

In the same issue of Philosophy Now in which Dr. Prinz’s article appeared, Dr. David Wong, another moral relativist, takes a different tack in trying to justify his relativist approach to moral behavior (“Making An Effort to Understand,” January 9, 2011). As we continue our brief analysis of the symposium on moral relativism presented in that issue, we’ll look next at Dr. Wong’s view of the sources of morality.

Dr. Wong explains his view that morality arises not as a function of mere emotions, but as a product of culture. People cannot not live together; therefore, they must learn to cooperate and get along. As they do, systems of cooperation emerge which solidify, over time, into moral codes prescribing proper ethical conduct. Social pressure thus becomes the guiding norm in moral decision-making.

Dr. Wong writes, “Because moral norms have functions, the content of moral norms can be assessed on the basis of their effectiveness in enabling the fulfillment of those functions.” And the functions Dr. Wong has in mind are those that maximize interpersonal cooperation.

But why “interpersonal cooperation” should be a guiding norm – other than that makes sense – is not examined.

In any given culture, the norms and functions contributing to interpersonal cooperation might be different, depending on whatever secondary matters that culture values the most – as, for example, human independency and privacy versus human interdependency and community. But in every culture, “Curbing the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest is obviously something that moral norms have to do.”

But why should that be obvious? And why is “cooperation” a higher value for ethical norms than emotions? Where does the notion of cooperation come from anyway? And why is that a norm to be preferred over, say, competition? Or oppression?

Dr. Wong doesn’t bother to explain such matters. He merely assumes we all agree that you can’t have people running around and doing whatever they feel like doing without regard for others; therefore, society must have some norms, culturally defined, which channel emotions and morals toward maximizing cooperation to the benefit of each and all.

Let me sum up...
We must resist the temptation here to try to explain in detail why Dr. Wong believes that cooperation is a higher moral norm than competition or oppression. Instead, as Inigo Montoya might have said, “Let me sum up.”

The Christian worldview can account for the human preference for cooperation, and it comes down, once again, to the fact that human beings are made in the image of God.

We saw that Dr. Prinz was borrowing on the Biblical teaching about the centrality of affections in human life. Now Dr. Wong is borrowing on the Biblical teaching that man is made for community and mutual respect and love. Evolution teaches that we are our brother’s meal; Scripture teaches that we are our brother’s keeper. This preference for community is a reflection of humans being made in the image of God, Who is a Trinity of Persons in one divine Godhead.

It is important for Christians to understand that, try though they may to get away from unchanging and objective norms and values, moral relativists cannot fully escape the reality and inevitability of their own humanness. They are image-bearers of God, and in order to make any sense at all – and they do offer some good things to ponder – they must borrow on the truth of God, whether or not they understand or acknowledge that this is what they’re doing. In so doing they lend more credence to a Biblical system of ethics and morality than one based on moral relativism in any of its manifestations.

Christians will make their ethical arguments into this conversation by identifying points of intersection between their Biblical view of moral norms and the views of other contributors, and then by showing – through argument and by gracious and hope-filled lives – the reality of the Biblical and Christian understanding of how we ought to live.

But we must be willing to engage the conversation, and we must make certain that, as we engage it, we understand and are living according to a system of moral behavior that is grounded squarely in the revealed truth of Scripture.

How dangerous is moral relativism? Order your copy of our new DVD series,Doing the Right Thing, and lead a group of your friends in understanding our present crisis of ethics. You should also read the article, “‘Society Says’ Relativism,” by Greg Koukl.